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Audit Committees, Boards of Directors,
and Remediation of Material Weaknesses
in Internal Control*
BENG WEE GOH, Singapore Management University
1. Introduction
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) was passed in 2002 in response to a series of
accounting improprieties at well-known companies sucb as Enron and WorldCom.
One important aspect of SOX is the internal control requirements. SOX section
302 requires that management evaluate the effectiveness of disclosure and control
procedures, report results of the evaluation, and indicate any "significant changes"
in internal controls since the last 10-K or 10-Q report (Securities and Exchange
Commission [SEC] 2002). In addition, SOX section 404 requires that manage-
ment's assessment of the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting
and auditors' attestation on management's assessment be included in firms' 10-K
reports (SEC 2003a). The heightened attention to internal control can enhance the
reliability of financial statements by helping companies to identify internal control
deficiencies and remediate these deficiencies in a timely manner (Charles River
Associates 2005).
Prior to SOX, little was understood about the remediation of internal control
deficiencies due to the lack of publicly available data on internal controls. The
remediation of internal control deficiencies is important because these deficiencies
can undermine the quality of a firm's financial reporting, as proxied by accruals
quality (Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, Kinney, and LaFond 2008; Doyle, Ge, and
McVay 2007a), and the remediation of these deficiencies can improve the quality
of financial reporting (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2008).' Furthermore, Moody's has
indicated that the existence of ongoing internal control problems can trigger negative
rating action against the firm (Moody's 2006), highlighting the need for remedia-
tion of internal control deficiencies to restore confidence in financial reporting. The
prompt remediation of these deficiencies also sends a strong signal to the market
that the firm is committed to and competent in ensuring credible financial report-
ing. Following prior evidence that the quality of the audit committee is associated
with the quality of financial reporting and internal controls (Carcello and Neal
2000; Krishnan 2005), this study examines whether corporate governance mechan-
isms, specifically the audit committee and the board of directors, play an important
role in monitoring the remediation of internal control deficiencies.
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Comiskey, whose valuable insights and comments have greatly improved this paper. I also thank
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Although the audit committee plays an important role in monitoring intemal
controls, the board of directors provides incremental oversight on intemal controls
as part of its fiduciary duties. Management often has self-interested incentives that
may not necessarily serve the best interests of shareholders. When intemal control
deficiencies are detected, management may not be willing to invest time and
resources in remediating these deficiencies because such efforts divert attention
and resources from the core businesses. Effective audit committees and boards of
directors can pressure management to invest in remediation efforts, resulting in
faster remediation. Hence, I hypothesize a positive association between the effec-
tiveness of the audit committee and the board and firms' timeliness in the remedia-
tion of intemal control deficiencies.
I collect data on 208 unique firms that are accelerated filers and that disclosed
at least one material weakness (MW) from July 2003 to December 2004 under
SOX 302.2 I focus on firms that disclose MWs to avoid the self-selection issues
associated with the voluntary disclosure of significant deficiencies (Doyle, Ge, and
McVay 2007b).3 Furthermore, MWs are the most severe type of internal control
deficiencies and, hence, their remediation should be of greater concem to investors
and regulators. The sample firms are identified using Compliance Week and Audit-
Analytics and the sample firms used in Doyle et al. 2007b.'* I determine firms'
timeliness in tbe remediation of MWs on the basis of how fast the firms receive a
subsequent unqualified SOX section 404 opinion. I measure the effectiveness of
the audit committee by its independence, financial expertise, size, and meeting fre-
quency, and the effectiveness of the board by its independence, size, and meeting
frequency, and by the duality of the chief executive officer (CEO) and chair positions
(CEO duality). I also examine other factors that can affect firms' timeliness in the
remediation of MWs, such as tbe severity of MWs, firms' profitability, the com-
plexity of firms' operations, and so on. An estimation of the ordered logistic regres-
sion model yields the following results, which are consistent with my hypotheses.
First, the proportion of audit committee members witb financial expertise is
positively associated with firms' timeliness in the remediation of MWs. However,
this result only holds for nonaccounting financial expertise (i.e., expertise gained
through experience supervising employees with financial reporting responsibilities
and overseeing the performance of companies) but not for accounting financial
expertise (i.e., expertise gained through accounting-related experience in SEC
reporting). Hence, it appears that the ability to effectively supervise and oversee
the remediation process may be more important than domain-specific expertise in
speeding up the remediation of MWs. Second, firms with larger audit committees
are more likely to remediate MWs in a timely manner. This result is consistent with
the view that a larger audit committee is more likely to question management on
remediation efforts and meet with intemal control system personnel, which in tum
speeds up the remediation of MWs. Third, I find that a more independent board is
associated with timelier remediation of MWs, suggesting that a more independent
board is less susceptible to the undue inñuence of management and more likely to
exert pressure on management to remediate MWs. Taken together, these results
suggest that the audit committee and the board play an important role in monitoring
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the remediation of MWs. Finally, the regression results show that firms that
promptly appoint a new and experienced chief financial officer (CFO) are more
likely to remediate MWs in a timely manner, while firms with more severe MWs,
lower profitability, and more complex operations are less likely to remediate MWs
in a timely manner.
This paper makes several contributions. First, it adds to the literature on internal
control by examining how the effectiveness of corporate govemance mechanisms
affects firms' timeliness in the remediation of MWs. Because such deficiencies,
especially when allowed to persist, expose firms to the risk of frauds and under-
mine the credibility of financial reporting, the results of this study can enhance our
understanding of important factors that are necessary to achieve a sound financial
reporting system and to restore investor confidence. This study also identifies other
important determinants of firms' timeliness in the remediation of MWs — namely,
the appointment of a new and experienced CFO, the severity of MWs, firms' profit-
ability, and the complexity of firms' operations.
Second, this study contributes to the literature on the effectiveness of corpor-
ate governance mechanisms, especially in the post-SOX period. The study also
sheds light on the efficacy of SOX requirements on the composition of the audit
committee. The lack of significant results for audit committee independence may
be due to firms' convergence toward fully independent audit committees under the
SOX regime, such that audit committee independence no longer distinguishes
between firms in terms of their govemance strength. However, I find that both a
larger audit committee and a more independent board help to ensure timelier remedi-
ation of MWs. Hence, firms can further tighten their corporate govemance under
the SOX regime by expanding their audit committees and by adding more independ-
ent directors to their boards. Given the debate over the definition of financial exper-
tise under SOX, this study shows that nonaccounting financial expertise is a
valuable component of the govemance expertise of audit committee members. This
lends support to the final provisions of SOX, which expand the definition of finan-
cial expertise to include nonaccounting expertise.
Third, this study complements other related studies. Krishnan (2005) finds a
negative relation between audit committee quality and the incidence of internal
control problems in the pre-SOX period. However, her study uses a restricted sample
of firms that are smaller and that change auditors in the pre-SOX period. This study
extends Krishnan 2005 by examining the remediation of MWs and by using firms
that are larger (due to their accelerated filer status) and that are required to disclose
MWs under SOX section 302. This study also complements Ashbaugh-Skaife et al.
2008, who find that the remediation of intemal control deficiencies improves the
quality of a firm's financial reporting. The results of this study suggest that effec-
tive audit committees and boards can improve the quality of financial reporting by
ensuring the timely remediation of MWs.
The next section develops the hypotheses. Section 3 describes the research
method and the data. Section 4 presents the empirical results and section 5 presents
the supplemental analyses. Section 6 concludes and discusses implications and
limitations.
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2. Hypothesis development
Audit committee effectiveness and the remediation of MWs
The SEC has stated that the audit committee is an important element of corporate
governance and is instrumental in ensuring the quality of financial reporting. The
role of the audit committee in the oversight of internal control has long been
emphasized. For instance, the SEC (1979) stresses the "importance of audit com-
mittees to enable board of directors to better fulfill their oversight responsibilities
with respect to an issuer's accounting, financial reporting and control obligations".
Indeed, studies have shown that audit committee members view monitoring internal
controls as one of their responsibilities (Carcello, Hermanson, and Neal 2002;
DeZoort 1997). Given the recent breakdowns in internal controls at several high-
profile companies such as Enron and WorldCom, regulatory requirements on the
audit committee's role in internal controls have tightened. For instance, the SEC
(2003b) mandates that all material written communications between a company's
accountant and management be provided to the entity's audit committee, which
communications include "reports on observations and recommendations on inter-
nal controls". Furthermore, SOX section 301 states that "each audit committee
shall establish procedures for the 'receipt, retention, and treatment' of complaints
received by the issuer regarding accounting, internal accounting controls, or audit-
ing matters" (emphasis added).
Studies have shown that the quality of the audit committee is positively associ-
ated with the quality of the firm's internal controls. Krishnan (2005) uses a sample
of firms that changed auditors over the period 1994-2000 and finds that independent
audit committees and audit committees with financial expertise are significantly
less likely to be associated with internal control problems. Zhang, Zhou, and Zhou
(2007) use a sample of firms that disclosed internal control deficiencies after the
enactment of SOX and find that these firms are more likely to have audit commit-
tees that have less financial expertise. If audit committee quality is associated with
the quality of internal controls, it seems reasonable to believe that a more effective
audit committee will ensure timelier remediation of MWs in order to maintain the
effectiveness of internal controls. An effective audit committee can directly engage
in overseeing the firm's controls by reviewing internal accounting procedures and
controls with the financial and accounting staff. When MWs are detected, an effec-
tive audit committee is more likely to take a hands-on approach and discuss with
the internal and external auditors how to remediate MWs. By diligently following
up on recommendations to improve internal controls and monitoring the progress
of the remediation efforts closely, a more effective audit committee is likely to
result in timelier remediation of MWs.
Although the audit committee monitors internal controls, management is ultim-
ately held responsible for implementing proper internal controls. Because the
remediation of MWs is often costly and can divert attention away from the core
businesses, management may be unwilling to engage actively in such remediation
efforts. Research has shown that an effective audit committee can have a strong
influence on management, such as constraining management's eamings manipulation
CAR Vol. 26 No. 2 (Summer 2009)
Remediation of Material Weaknesses in Internal Control 553
(Klein 2002a) and infiuencing management to employ an industry specialist audi-
tor (Abbott and Parker 2000). Hence, I expect an effective audit committee to exert
a strong infiuence on management to invest the time and resources in remediation
efforts. An effective audit committee is more likely to question whether manage-
ment has exercised sufficient diligence in ensuring proper controls. By exerting its
authority, the audit committee set a strong "tone at the top" that can raise manage-
ment's proactiveness in remediating MWs.^ The above discussions lead to the fol-
lowing hypothesis:
HYPOTHESIS 1. The effectiveness of the audit committee is positively associated
with firms' timeliness in the remediation of MWs.
Board effectiveness and the remediation of MWs
Although the audit committee plays an important role in monitoring the remedia-
tion of MWs, the board of directors can provide incremental oversight on the
remediation process.^ Within large corporations, agency conflicts arise due to
the separation of ownership and control (Fama and Jensen 1983). To deal with
these conflicts and to protect shareholders' interests, the board assumes an over-
sight role that involves monitoring top management, approving the corporation's
strategy, monitoring the internal control system, and ensuring the quality of financial
reports. When MWs in internal control exist, management has greater opportunities
to engage in opportunistic behaviors. For instance, management is more likely to
manipulate eamings to maximize bonus compensation when duties are not prop-
erly segregated or when the company lacks an effective internal audit function. As
such, the board can discharge its fiduciary duties in monitoring management by
ensuring that management take prompt actions to remediate MWs and maintain
internal control quality.'
Studies have shown that the board can oust top management from the firm for
aggressive accounting (Desai, Hogan, and Wilkins 2006). The board's imposing
similar disciplinary actions on top management for internal control failures can
create strong pressure for top management to remediate MWs promptly. A more
effective board is likely to have a stronger infiuence on management and monitor
the actions of management. For instance, studies have shown that a more effective
board can deter managerial actions leading to frauds and SEC enforcement actions
(Beasley 1996; Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney 1996). Weisbach (1988) also finds
that a more effective board increases the likelihood of CEO turnover due to poor
financial performance. Hence, I expect a more effective board to result in timelier
remediation of MWs.
HYPOTHESIS 2. The effectiveness of the board is positively associated with
firms ' timeliness in the remediation of MWs.
3. Research method and data
Measurement of firms'timeliness in the remediation of MWs
Management's disclosure of MWs often consists of a list of problems, so it is difficult
to trace the remediation of each individual problem. Furthermore, management's
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disclosure of remediation efforts may be vague, making it subjective to pinpoint
exactly when remediation is completed. Hence, I consider the remediation of MWs
in their entirety and not as individual weaknesses per se.^ This definition of reme-
diation is cleaner and considers the quality of the firm's internal control environ-
ment as a whole; that is, firms are deemed to have failed to fully remediate MWs so
long as any MW remains unremediated.
Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2008) determine whether a firm remediates internal
control deficiencies on the basis of the receipt of a subsequent unqualified SOX
section 404 opinion. Because an unqualified SOX section 404 opinion objectively
and unambiguously shows that the firm has fully remediated its MWs, I use the
SOX section 404 opinions to determine firms' timeliness in the remediation of
MWs. The categorical variable REMEDIED is used to measure firms' timeliness in
the remediation of MWs. It is equal to 2 {FAST remediators) if the firm remediates
MWs within the first SOX section 404 report (i.e., the first and second SOX section
404 opinions are unqualified). It is equal to 1 (SLOW remediators) if the firm reme-
diates MWs within the second SOX section 404 report (i.e., the first SOX section
404 opinion is adverse but the second SOX section 404 opinion is unqualified).
Lastly, it is equal to 0 {NON remediators) if the firm fails to remediate MWs even
within the second SOX section 404 report (i.e., the first and second SOX section
404 opinions are adverse).
Measurement of the effectiveness of the audit committee and the board
I first measure the independence of the audit committee because prior studies show
that audit committee independence is negatively related to the incidence of internal
control problems (Krishnan 2005). I also measure board independence because
more independent boards reduce the likelihood of accounting fraud (Beasley
1996). ACINDP is an indicator variable that equals 1 if all members on the audit
committee are independent, and 0 otherwise.^ Because the audit committee is part
of the board, full board characteristics (based on all the board members) could
simply refiect audit committee characteristics, and vice versa.'" Hence, I follow
Carcello and Neal 2003 (UO) and measure the characteristics of nonaudit commit-
tee board members. BDINDP is the proportion of nonaudit committee members
who are independent.
Next, I measure the level of financial expertise of the audit committee because
Krishnan (2005) and Zhang et al. (2007) find that firms are more likely to have
internal control problems if their audit committees have lower financial expertise.
Although SOX section 407 requires firms to disclose whether they have a financial
expert on the audit committee, there are controversies over how to define financial
expertise.' 1 Following DeFond et al. 2005,1 use two definitions of financial exper-
tise. ACCEXP is the proportion of audit committee members with "accounting
financial expertise"; that is, expertise gained through accounting-related experi-
ence in SEC reporting (e.g., public accountant, auditor, CFO, controller, or chief
accounting officer). NONACCEXP is the proportion of audit committee members
with "nonaccounting financial expertise"; that is, expertise gained through experi-
ence supervising employees with financial reporting responsibilities and overseeing
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the performance of companies (e.g., CEO, president, general partner, or manag-
ing director of a for-profit corporation).
The sizes of the audit committee and the board also influence effectiveness. A
larger audit committee is more likely to generate substantial discussions, consider
emerging issues, question management, and meet with intemal control system per-
sonnel (DeZoort, Hermanson, Archambeault, and Reed 2002; Anderson, Mansi,
and Reeb 2004). Although Yermack (1996) finds that a larger board reduces firm
value, Dalton, Daily, Johnson, and Ellstrand (1999) find that board size is positively
associated with financial performance. Given these mixed empirical findings, I do
not predict how board size affects firms' timeliness in the remediation of MWs. I
measure audit committee size (ACSIZE) using the number of audit committee
members. As was the case for board independence, I measure board size (BDSIZE)
using nonaudit committee board characteristics. BDSIZE is the number of nonaudit
committee board members.
I also measure tbe meeting frequency of the audit committee and the board
because an audit committee or a board that meets more frequently is more likely to
discuss remediation efforts with management and the auditors, thus helping to speed
up the remediation process. However, it is also possible that more meetings subse-
quent to the detection of MWs may simply reflect the magnitude of the problems
being faced by the firm (Krishnan 2005; Zhang et al. 2007). Hence, I do not make
predictions on the relation between firms' timeliness in the remediation of MWs
and the meeting frequency of the audit committee and the board. ACMEET and
BDMEET are the number of times the audit committee and the board, respectively,
meet in a fiscal year.
Finally, separating the CEO and chair positions (non-CEO duality) can
strengthen board effectiveness because it prevents tbe CEO from limiting board
activities by means of controlling the board's chair position (Jensen 1993). How-
ever, Finkelstein and D'Aveni (1994) argue that the board may be more vigilant in
the presence of CEO duality. Hence, it is not clear how CEO duality affects the
board's effectiveness in monitoring the remediation of MWs. To measure CEO
duality, I use an indicator variable NDUALITY that equals 1 if the CEO and chair
positions are held by different individuals, and 0 otherwise. Table 1 summarizes
the above corporate govemance measures and their expected signs.
Firms may have weak govemance at the time of detection of MWs (Krishnan
2005). Measuring govemance variables at the end of the remediation process better
captures how govemance strength affects the remediation of MWs and allows for
the possibility that govemance stmctures improve upon detection of MWs. Hence,
for the FASTzná SLOW remediators, the govemance variables are measured at the
end of the fiscal year in which the firm first receives an unqualified SOX section
404 report. For the NON remediators, because the MWs have not been remediated,
the governance variables are measured at the end of the fiscal year in which the
second SOX section 404 report is issued. For meeting frequency, I use the number
of times tbe audit committee or the board meets during the fiscal year in which the
firm first receives an unqualified SOX section 404 report. In the case of NON reme-
diators, I use the number of times the audit committee or the board meets during
. 26 No. 2 (Summer 2009)




REMEDIED REMEDIED is equal to 2 {FAST remediators) if the firm remediates
MWs within the first SOX section 404 report (i.e., the first and second
SOX secdon 404 opinions are unqualified). REMEDIED is equal to 1
{SLOW remediators) if the firm remediates MWs within the second
SOX section 404 report (i.e., the first SOX section 404 opinion is
adverse but the second SOX section 404 opinion is unqualified).
REMEDIED is equal to 0 {NON remediators) if the firm fails to
remediate MWs even within the second SOX section 404 report (i.e.,
the first and second SOX section 404 opinions are adverse).
ACINDP An indicator variable that equals 1 if all members on the audit
committee are independent, and 0 otherwise.
ACCEXP Proportion of audit committee members with accounting financial
experdse; that is, expertise gained through accounting-related
experience in SEC reporting (e.g., public accountant, auditor, CEO,
controller, or chief accounting officer).
NONACCEXP Proportion of audit committee members with nonaccounting financial
expertise; that is, expertise gained through experience supervising
employees with financial reporting responsibilities and overseeing the
performance of companies (e.g., CEO, president, general partner, or
managing director of a for-profit corporation).
ACSIZE Number of audit committee members.
ACMEET Number of times the audit committee meets in a fiscal year.
BDINDP Proportion of nonaudit committee board members who are
independent.
BDSIZE Number of nonaudit committee board members.
BDMEET Number of times the board meets in a fiscal year.
NDUAUTY An indicator variable that equals 1 if the CEO and chairman positions
are held by different individuals, and 0 otherwise.
MW_SEVERITY An indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm reports at least one
category B MW in its initial or subsequent disclosures, and 0
otherwise.
AUDJCHANGE An indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm changed auditors
subsequent to the detection of MWs, and 0 otherwise.
NEWJCFO An indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm appoints a new CFO
with prior experience in a similar capacity within 12 months of the
detection of MWs, and 0 otherwise.
(The table is continued on the next page.)
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TABLE 1 (Continued)
Variables Definition
FIN_DISTRESS Average financial distress measure during the remediation
period, measured from the probit coefficients of Zmijewski 1984
(69). It is calculated as the cumulative distribution function of
-4.336 - 4.513/f£M + 5.619FINL + 0.004LIQ, where ROA is net
income (COMPUSTAT item #13) divided by total assets
(COMPUSTAT item #6), FINL is total debt (COMPUSTAT item #9
+ COMPUSTAT item #34) divided by total assets (COMPUSTAT
item #6), and LIQ is current assets (COMPUSTAT item #4) divided
by current liabilities (COMPUSTAT item #5). Greater values of
FIN_DISTRESS indicate higher levels of distress present in the firm.
ROA Average return on assets during the remediation period, calculated as
net income (COMPUSTAT item #13) divided by total assets
(COMPUSTAT item #6).
LGTA The log of average total assets (COMPUSTAT item #6) during the
remediation period.
SEGMENTS Number of business segments as reported by the COMPUSTAT
segment file.
FOREIGN An indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm reports any nonzero
foreign currency adjustments (COMPUSTAT item #150) during the
remediation period, and 0 otherwise.
GROWTH Average percentage change in sales (COMPUSTAT item #12) during
the remediation period.
RESTRUCTURE An indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm reports any nonzero
restructuring charges (COMPUSTAT item #376) during the
remediation period, and 0 otherwise.
M¿¿A An indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm reports any mergers or
acquisitions as indicated in COMPUSTAT AFTNTl during the
remediafion period, and 0 otherwise.
LITIGATION An indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm operates in industries
with SIC codes of 2833-2836 (biotechnology), 3570-3577 and
7370-7374 (computers), 3600-3674 (electronics), and 5200-6961
(retailing), and 0 otherwise.
the fiscal year in which the second SOX section 404 report is issued. All information
on the govemance variables is obtained from the proxy statements. I determine the
independence and financial expertise of the directors from their employment his-
tory, family relationships, and other material relationships, which are disclosed in
the proxy statements.
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Other factors affecting firms'timeliness in the remediation of MWs
Severe MWs may take more time to remediate. Consistent with Doyle et al. 2007b,
I follow the logic put forth in Moody's 2004 to classify the severity of MWs. The
less severe category A weaknesses relate to controls over specific account balances
or transaction processes, and are identifiable by auditors through substantive test-
ing. The more severe category B weaknesses relate to macro-level controls such as
the control environment and the overall financial reporting process, which auditors
may not be able to effectively "audit around".'^ MW_SEVERITY is an indicator
variable that equals 1 if the firm reports at least one category B MW in its initial or
subsequent disclosures, and 0 otherwise. I also examine auditor changes because
such changes may reveal troublesome audit situations that can affect remediation
time. Auditor change firms also tend to be smaller and trade on the smaller stock
exchanges (Krishnan 2005). I átfine AUDjCHANGE as an indicator variable that
equals 1 if the firm changed auditors subsequent to the detection of MWs, and 0
otherwise. Geiger and North (2006) find that the CFO wields great influence over
financial reporting and that the appointment of a new CFO can improve financial
reporting. Hence, I examine whether the prompt appointment of a new and experi-
enced CFO helps remediate MWs faster. NEW_CFO is an indicator variable that
equals 1 if the firm appoints a new CFO with prior experience in a similar capacity
within 12 months of the detection of MWs, and 0 otherwise.
Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, and Kinney (2007) and Doyle et al. (2007b) find
that firms that are smaller, financially weaker, more complex, growing rapidly, and
undergoing organizational changes (i.e., through restructuring or mergers and
acquisitions) are more likely to have internal control problems. I expect financially
weaker firms to face greater difficulties in remediating MWs. It is unclear how the
other characteristics affect the remediation time. For instance, firms that are more
complex have greater incentives to remediate MWs but may need more time because
of their complexity.'^ Hence, I do not predict their effect on remediation time.
I capture distress risk using Zmijewski's 1984 measure of financial distress
(F1N_DISTRESS) and profitability using return on assets (ROA). The values of
these variables are averaged over the remediation period — that is, from the fiscal
year the MWs are disclosed to the fiscal year the MWs are remediated.^^ I measure
complexity using (a) the log of average total assets (LGTA) during the remediation
period, (b) the number of business segments within the firm (SEGMENTS), and
(c) the presence of foreign operations, measured by the indicator variable FOREIGN
that equals 1 if the firm reports any nonzero foreign currency adjustments during
the remediation period, and 0 otherwise. Sales growth (GROWTH) is measured as
the average percentage change in sales during the remediation period. I use
RESTRUCTURE and M&A to proxy for organizational changes during the remedi-
ation period. RESTRUCTURE (M&A) is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the
firm reports any nonzero restructuring charges (mergers or acquisitions as indi-
cated in COMPUSTAT AFTNTl) during the remediation period, and 0 otherwise.
Lastly, firms operating in more litigious industries may face greater incentives to
remediate MWs in order to reduce legal liability. LITIGATION is an indicator
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variable that equals 1 if the firm operates in a litigious industry, and 0 otherwise.'^
Table 1 summarizes how the above variables are measured or computed, and their
expected signs.
Regression model
I use the following model to test the relation between the effectiveness of the audit
committee and the board, and firms' timeliness in the remediation of MWs.
Because the dependent variable is categorical and ordinal, I use the ordered logistic
regression model (Long 1997).
?{REMEDIED) = a + b^ACINDP + b2ACCEXP + b^NONACCEXP
+ b^ACSIZE + b^ACMEET + b^BDINDP + byBDSIZE
+ b^BDMEET + bgNDUALITY + bioMW_SEVERITY
+ buAUD_CHANGE + bi2NE
+ b^2FIN_DISTRESS + by^ROA +
4- b^^RESTRUCTURE + ¿»20^*^ + b2\UTIGATI0N + e.
Data
I use Compliance Week, AuditAnalytics, and the sample firms used in Doyle et al.
2007b to identify firms that disclosed MWs in their 10-Q, 10-K, or 8-K filings
from July 2003 to December 2004 under SOX section 302.1 end the sample period
in December 2004 to allow a sufficiently long period to observe firms' remediation
efforts. These initial SOX section 302 disclosures pertain to periods ending on or
before October 31, 2004 and precede SOX section 404 reporting. As mentioned in
the introduction, I choose firms that disclose MWs to avoid the self-selection
issues associated with the voluntary disclosure of significant deficiencies, and
because MWs are the most severe type of deficiencies. I also focus on accelerated
filers under SOX section 404 because the SOX section 404 opinions provide an
objective way to determine whether management has fully remediated the MWs.'^
Lastly, I exclude firms that terminated their securities registration, firms without
the second SOX section 404 reports, firms that failed to file 10-K reports since
SOX section 404 reporting, firms with weaknesses that are dated too far back, firms
that are foreign issuers, firms that are a subsidiary of another MW firm, and firms
with missing proxy statements.'' Table 2 summarizes the sample collection proce-
dure and shows the sample composition by industry. Among the 208 sample firms,
76 are FAST remediators, 73 are SLOW remediators, and 59 are A^ OA' remediators. ' ^
4. Empirical results
Descriptive statistics and univariate analyses
Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics for the full sample and its partitions by
the remediation time. It also presents two-tailed tests of differences in means and
medians between any two groups of remediators. The results for the audit committee
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variables provide some preliminary evidence for Hypothesis 1. First, the FAST
remediators have significantly higher mean and median values for ACINDP than
the SLOW remediators and significantly higher mean and median values for NON-
ACCEXP than the NON remediators. Next, I find that the FAST remediators have
significantly higher mean and median values for ACSIZE than the other groups of
remediators. These results indicate that firms with more independent audit commit-
tees, audit committees with greater nonaccounting financial expertise, and larger
TABLE 2
Sample collection procedure and sample composition
Panel A: Sample collection procedure
Total MWs (July 2003 to December 2004)* 515
Less
Nonaccelerated filers (151)
Securities registration termination (74)
No second SOX section 404 reportst ( 12)
No filings or delays in the filings of 10-K reports since SOX section 40
reporting (30)
Weaknesses dated too far back (13)
Foreign issuers (12)
Subsidiary of another MW firm (8)
Proxy statements used to obtain the govemance data were not available (7)
Final sample (July 2003 to December 2004) 208
Panel B: Sample composition by industry
Two-digit SIC code Industry description Number of firms
10-17 Mining and construction 21
20-39 Manufacturing 72
40-49 Transportation and utilities 30
50-59 Wholesale and retail 13




* Doyle et al. (2007b) report a total of 970 unique firms with MWs from August 2002
to August 2005. However, many of these firms disclosed MWs subsequent to
December 31, 2004; these firms first disclosed MWs under SOX section 404. This
explains the difference in the number of sample firms identified between the two
studies.
t Seven firms filed the first SOX section 404 report, but failed to file the second SOX
section 404 report in a timely manner. Five firms became nonaccelerated filers
after issuing the first SOX section 404 report.
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audit committees are more likely to remediate MWs in a timely manner. I also find
that the NON remediators have significantly higher mean and median values for
ACMEET than the other groups of remediators, suggesting that audit committee
meeting frequency refiects the magnitude of the problems being faced by the firm.
The results for the board variables also provide some preliminary evidence for
Hypothesis 2.1 find that the FAST remediators have significantly higher mean and
median values for BDINDP than the A^OA^  remediators. The mean and median values
for NDUALITY are also significantly lower for the M 5 r remediators relative to the
other groups of remediators. These results suggest that firms with more independ-
ent boards and with CEO duality are more likely to remediate MWs in a timely
manner. As was the case for the audit committee, the A'OA'remediators have signif-
icantly higher mean and median values for BDMEET than the SLOW remediators.
Hence, board meeting frequency may also refiect the magnitude of the problems
being faced by the firm.
Turning to the other variables, both the SLOW and NON remediators have sig-
nificantly higher mean and median values for MW_SEVERITY than the F/45r reme-
diators, indicating that more severe MWs may take a longer time to remediate. The
SLOW remediators have significantly higher mean and median values for
AUDJCHANGE than the FA5r remediators, suggesting that auditor changes sub-
sequent to the detection of MWs may impede remediation efforts. The FAST
remediators have significantly higher mean and median values for NEW_CFO than
the A'OA' remediators, indicating that the prompt appointment of a new, experi-
enced CFO may speed up the remediation of MWs. I also find that the FAST
remediators have significantly higher mean and median values for ROA than the
other groups of remediators and a significantly higher mean value for
FIN_DISTRESS than the NON remediators. Hence, low profitability and financial
distress may slow down remediation efforts. Lastly, the//OA^ remediators have sig-
nificantly higher mean and median values for FOREIGN than the FAST remediators,
implying that firms with more complex operations likely face greater challenges in
remediating MWs.
Muttivariate analysis
Table 4 presents the ordered logistic regression results. The model is significant, as
indicated by its chi-square value (p-value < 0.0001). The pseudo R^ of the model
is 41 percent, suggesting high goodness of fit. Wald chi-square statistics are used to
test the significance of the coefficient estimates in the model.'^
Hypothesis I predicts a positive association between audit committee effec-
tiveness and firms' timeliness in the remediation of MWs. Consistent with this
hypothesis, I find that the coefficient on NONACCEXP is positive and significant
(p-value < 0.05). This result suggests that audit committees with greater non-
accounting financial expertise (i.e., expertise gained through experience supervising
employees with financial reporting responsibilities and overseeing the performance
of companies) are more effective in monitoring the remediation of MWs. In con-
trast, the coefficient on ACCEXP is not significant at the conventional level, sug-
gesting that the audit committee's accounting financial expertise (i.e., expertise
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TABLE 4
Ordered logistic regression results for firms' timeliness in the remediation of MWs
^(REMEDIED) = a + b^ACINDP + b2ACCEXP + b^NONACCEXP + b^ACSIZE
+ b^ACMEET + b^BDINDP + bjBDSIZE + b^BDMEET
+ bgNDUAUTY + b¡oMW_SEVERITY + b¡iAUD_CHANGE
bi3FIN_DISTRESS + ¿,4/fOA -I- bi¡LGTA
+ b^FOREIGN + b^^GROWTH

































































































Variables are as defined in Table 1.
Significant at the 0.01 percent level (one-tailed tests where the signs are predicted,
and two-tailed tests otherwise).
t Significant at the 0.05 percent level (one-tailed tests where the signs are predicted,
and two-tailed tests otherwise).
CAR Vol. 26 No. 2 (Summer 2009)
566 Contemporary Accounting Research
gained through accounting-related experience with SEC reporting) does not help to
speed up the remediation process. One explanation for these findings is that the
ability to effectively supervise and oversee the remediation process may be more
important than domain-specific expertise (i.e., knowledge of accounting and inter-
nal control systems) in speeding up the remediation of MWs.
Table 4 also shows that the coefficient on ACSIZE is positive and significant
(p-value < 0.01), suggesting that firms with larger audit committees are more
likely to remediate MWs in a timely manner. This result supports the view that a
larger audit committee is more likely to question management and meet with inter-
nal control system personnel, which in turn speeds up the remediation of MWs.
Contrary to the results of the univariate analyses, the coefficients on ACINDP and
ACMEET are not significant at the conventional level. The lack of a significant
result for ACINDP may be due to firms' convergence toward fully independent
audit committees under the SOX regime, such that audit committee independence
no longer distinguishes between firms in terms of their govemance strength.
The results in Table 4 also provide some support for Hypothesis 2, which pre-
dicts a positive association between board effectiveness and firms' timeliness in the
remediation of MWs. Specifically, the coefficient on BDINDP is positive and sig-
nificant (p-value < 0.05), indicating that a more independent board is associated
with timelier remediation of MWs. This result is consistent with the view that a
more independent board is less susceptible to the undue influence of management
and more able to exert pressure on management to remediate MWs. Hence, a more
independent board better protects shareholders' interests by improving the quality
of intemal controls. Contrary to the results of the univariate analyses, the coefficients
on BDMEET and NDUALITY aie not significant at the conventional level.20
Among the other variables, the coefficient on MW_SEVER1TY is negative and
significant (p-value < 0.01). Hence, more severe MWs (i.e., those relating to
macro-level controls such as ineffective control environment and weak tone at the
top) take longer time to remediate. The coefficient on NEWjCFO is positive and
significant (p-value < 0.01), indicating that the prompt appointment of a new
and experienced CFO helps to speed up the remediation of MWs. The coefficient
on ROA is positive and significant (p-value < 0.01), suggesting that low profitabil-
ity can put even more strain on firms' remediation efforts. Finally, the coefficient
on FOREIGN is negative and significant (p-value < 0.01). This result indicates
that firms with more complex operations are likely to face greater challenges in
remediating MWs.
Overall, the results provide empirical support for Hypotheses 1 and 2. The
nonaccounting financial expertise and size of the audit committee and the independ-
ence of the board are positively associated with firms' timeliness in the remediation
of MWs. These results suggest that the audit committee and the board play an
important role in monitoring the remediation of MWs. Because the remediation of
MWs can improve financial reporting quality (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2008), effec-
tive audit committees and boards can maintain high-quality financial reporting by
ensuring the timely remediation of MWs. Although effective corporate govemance
mechanisms are key to achieving timely remediation of MWs, the results show that
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other factors such as the prompt appointment of a new and experienced CFO, the
severity of the MWs, firms' profitability, and the complexity of firms' operations
can affect the remediation time of MWs.
5. Supplemental analyses
Severe MW sample
Table 4 shows that the severity of MWs is negatively associated with firms' timeli-
ness in the remediation of MWs. As a sensitivity test, I estimate the model using
only firms that disclosed severe MWs. There are 157 firms (75 percent of the 208
sample firms) that disclosed severe MWs. The results, presented in model 1 of
Table 5, are consistent with those in Table 4. The coefficients on NONACCEXP,
ACSIZE, and BDINDP are positive and significant (/7-value < 0.05).
Alternative measures of firms' timeliness in the remediation of MWs
I also define three alternative measures of firms' timeliness in the remediation of
MWs. First, I combine the SLOW and NON remediators, and define the dependent
variable as an indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm remediates MWs within
the first SOX section 404 report, and 0 otherwise.^' Second, I combine the FAST
and SLOW remediators and define the dependent variable as an indicator variable
that equals 1 if the firm remediates MWs within the second SOX section 404
report, and 0 otherwise. Lastly, I drop the 5L0W remediators and define the depend-
ent variable as an indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm remediates MWs
within the first SOX section 404 report, and 0 if the firm fails to remediate MWs even
within the second SOX section 404 report. The binary logistic regression results
are presented in models 2, 3, and 4 of Table 5, respectively.
The results are generally consistent with those in Table 4. The coefficient on
NONACCEXP is positive and significant in models 3 and 4 (p-value < 0.05). The
coefficient on ACSIZE is positive and significant in models 2 and 4 (p-value < 0.01),
and positive and marginally significant in model 3 (p-value < 0.10). Finally, the coef-
ficient on BDINDP is positive and significant in all three models (p-value < 0.05).
Hence, the results in Table 4 are robust to alternative measures of firms' timeliness
in the remediation of MWs.22
Alternative measures of audit committee and board effectiveness
I also examine alternative definitions of governance measures. First, I measure
audit committee independence as the proportion of audit committee members who
are independent (Krishnan 2005). Second, I measure audit committee accounting
financial expertise using an indicator variable that equals 1 if the audit committee
has at least one member with accounting financial expertise, and 0 otherwise. The
results (not tabulated) show that the coefficients on these variables are not signifi-
cant at the conventional level, consistent with the earlier results. Next, I measure
audit committee financial expertise as defined by SOX. I replace ACCfXP and
NONACCEXP in the model in Table 4 with a variable that measures the proportion
of audit committee members with either accounting or nonaccounting financial
expertise, or both. The results (not tabulated) show that the coefficient on the new
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TABLE 5 (Continued)
Notes:
Variables are as defined in Table 1. Model 1 shows the ordered logistic regression results
using only firms that disclose severe MWs. This sample consists of firms that
reported at least one category B MW in their initial or subsequent disclosures.
Model 2 shows the binary logistic regression results of the firm's likelihood of
remediating MWs within the first SOX section 404 report. Model 3 shows the binary
logistic regression results of the firm's likelihood of remediating MWs within the
second SOX section 404 report. Model 4 shows the binary logistic regression results
of the firm's likelihood of remediating MWs within the first SOX section 404 report
or of failing to remediate MWs even within the second SOX section 404 report.
* Significant at the 0.01 percent level (one-tailed tests where the signs are predicted,
and two-tailed tests otherwise).
t Significant at the 0.05 percent level (one-tailed tests where the signs are predicted,
and two-tailed tests otherwise).
^ Significant at the 0.10 percent level (one-tailed tests where the signs are predicted,
and two-tailed tests otherwise).
variable is positive and significant (p-value < 0.05), suggesting that greater audit
committee financial expertise (as defined by SOX) is associated with timelier
remediation of MWs. Lastly, I measure audit corrmiittee (board) meeting frequency
using an indicator variable that equals 1 if the number of audit committee (board)
meetings is above the median, and 0 otherwise. The results (not tabulated) are sim-
ilar to those in Table 4.
Composite measure of corporate governance
I further examine whether corporate governance as a whole is associated with
timelier remediation of MWs. I use the governance score, GOVSCORE, created
by Brown and Caylor 2006.^3 xhe score is a composite measure of 51 factors
encompassing eight corporate governance categories: audit, board of directors,
charter/bylaws, director education, executive and director compensation, owner-
ship, progressive practices, and state of incorporation. A higher score indicates
stronger corporate govemance. Only 136 sample firms have an available govem-
ance score. I replace the audit committee and board variables in Table 4 with
GOVSCORE. The results (not tabulated) show that GOVSCORE is positive and
marginally significant (p-value < 0.05), providing evidence that a stronger overall
corporate govemance structure is associated with timelier remediation of MWs.
Corporate governance changes upon detection of MWs
The results in Tables 4 and 5 show that more effective audit committees and boards
are associated with timelier remediation of MWs. It is possible that firms that
remediate MWs promptly have taken steps to improve their govemance structures,
while firms that fail to remediate MWs promptly have not. To shed light on this
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issue, I conduct additional analyses to examine corporate governance changes of
the FAST, SLOW, and NON remediators upon detection of MWs. Table 6 shows the
changes in audit committee and board characteristics from the year before the detec-
tion of MWs to the year after the detection of MWs.
The results show that the sample firms exhibit significant increases in independ-
ence {ACINDF), accounting financial expertise {ACCEXP), financial expertise
based on SOX definition (FINEXP), size {ACSIZE), and meeting frequency
{ACMEET) of the audit committee, and independence {BDINDP) and meeting fre-
quency {BDMEET) of the board. However, there are no significant differences in
the corporate govemance changes among the three groups of remediators, except
that the increase in ACSIZE is significantly different between the SLOW and
/v\5r remediators (p-value < 0.05). Hence, the significant association between the
effectiveness of corporate govemance mechanisms and firms' timeliness in the reme-
diation of MWs is not fully attributable to the improvement in govemance structures
subsequent to the detection of MWs.
6. Conclusion, implications, and limitations
This study examines whether the effectiveness of corporate govemance mechan-
isms is associated with firms' timeliness in the remediation of MWs. I find that
firms with larger audit committees, audit committees with greater nonaccounting
financial expertise, and more independent boards are more likely to remediate
MWs in a timely manner. The results have some implications. First, although the
major exchanges require audit committees to have at least three directors, the results
of this study suggest that firms can enhance the monitoring of intemal controls by
expanding their audit committees. With regard to the controversies over the defini-
tion of financial expertise under SOX section 407, the results of this study suggest
that the nonaccounting financial expertise of the audit committee members
enhances the monitoring of MW remediation. Hence, nonaccounting financial
expertise is a valuable component of the govemance expertise of the audit commit-
tee members. This finding lends support to the final provisions of SOX, which
expand the definition of financial expertise to include nonaccounting expertise.
This study has certain limitations. First, prior studies show that firms with
effective audit committees are less likely to have intemal control problems (Krish-
nan 2005; Zhang et al. 2007). The sample in this study comprises firms with MWs
and may thus be biased in favor of firms with relatively ineffective audit commit-
tees. The lack of sufficient variation in audit committee characteristics can also
work against finding significant results for these characteristics. Furthermore,
using firms that disclose MWs and that are accelerated filers limits the generaliz-
ability of the results of this study.
Second, firms that terminate their securities registration or delay the filing of
their 10-K reports are excluded from the sample. It is not clear how the addition
of these firms would affect the results of this study.2^* Third, the statistical power of
the various tests performed may be low due to the small sample size. Lastly, this is
a study of association, not causation. It is possible that unobserved factors that are
correlated with both intemal control quality and govemance characteristics drive
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TABLE 6 (Continued)
Notes:
Variables are as defined in Table 1. FINEXP is the proportion of audit committee members
with either accounting or nonaccounting financial expertise, or both. This definition
of financial expertise is consistent with that of SOX. Nine firms are excluded from the
analysis due to the lack of proxy statements for the year before the detection of MWs.
A two-sample /-test is used to test for significant differences in mean values of
changes between two groups of remediators.
* Indicates that the changes in corporate governance variables from the year before the
detection of MWs to the year after the detection of MWs are statistically
significant at less than 1 percent, based on two-tailed tests.
t Indicates that the changes in corporate governance variables from the year before the
detection of MWs to the year after the detection of MWs are statistically
significant at less than 5 percent, based on two-tailed tests.
t Indicates that the changes in corporate governance variables from the year before the
detection of MWs to the year after the detection of MWs are statistically
significant at less than 10 percent, based on two-tailed tests.
§ Significant at the 0.05 percent level (two-tailed).
* Significant at the 0.10 percent level (two-tailed).
the findings. This problem is mitigated by adding various variables that are found
to affect internal control quality in the post-SOX period (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al.
2007; Doyle et al. 2007b).
Endnotes
1. Anecdotal evidence also suggests that internal control deficiencies lead to fraudulent
financial reporting. In 1999, a study conducted by the Committee of Sponsoring
Organizations of the Treadway Commission 1999 asserted that a poor internal control
environment contributed to the occurrences of fraud documented over the 10-year time
frame 1987-1997. Former SEC commissioner Issac Hunt Jr., in his speech in 1999,
also noted that "internal control deficiencies were undermining the financial reporting
system" (Hunt 1999).
2. An accelerated filer (a U.S. company with market capitalization over $75 million that
has filed at least one annual report with the SEC) was required to comply with SOX
section 404 requirements for its first fiscal year ending on or after November 15, 2004.
A nonaccelerated filer must comply with the management reporting requirements
under SOX section 404 for its fiscal years ending on or after December 15, 2007, and
with the auditor attestation requirements under SOX section 404 for its fiscal years
ending on or after December 15, 2008.
According to Auditing Standards (AS) No. 2 (Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board [PCAOB] 2004), a MW is "a significant deficiency, or combination of
significant deficiencies, that results in more than a remote likelihood that a material
misstatement of the financial statements will not be prevented or detected". A
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significant deficiency is "a control deficiency, or combination of control deficiencies,
that adversely affects the company's ability to initiate, authorize, record, process, or
report extemal financial data reliably in accordance with generally accepted accounting
principles such that there is more than a remote likelihood that a misstatement of the
company's annual or interim financial statements that is more than inconsequential will
not be prevented or detected".
3. Although both MWs and significant deficiencies are deficiencies in the design or
operation of intemal controls, significant deficiencies are less severe and are not
required to be publicly disclosed under SOX section 302 (SEC 2004). Hence, the
disclosure of significant deficiencies is clearly voluntary. On the other hand, under
SOX section 302, if management identifies a MW in its controls, it is precluded from
reporting that the controls are effective and must disclose the identified MW. Hence,
the disclosure of MWs is effectively mandatory.
4. I thank Jeffrey Doyle, Weili Ge, and Sarah McVay for sharing the data. The data can be
found at http://faculty.washington.edu/geweili/ICdata.html.
5. Readers can refer to the 10-K report of Spatialight Inc. for the year ending December
31, 2005 for an example of how the audit committee questioned management's failure
to ensure proper intemal controls. The example also highlights how the audit
committee handled the remediation efforts and exercised its authority and oversight on
management.
6. Krishnan (2005) also maintains that the quality of an entity's intemal control is a
function of the quality of its control environment, which includes the board of directors
and the audit committee. By examining both audit committee and board
characteristics, this study can provide evidence on the relative contribution of each
component in monitoring the remediation of MWs.
7. Readers can refer to the 10-K report of Curon Medical Inc. for the year ending
December 31, 2004 for an example of how the board directed management to
implement corrective measures on the intemal control deficiencies.
8. For example, weaknesses A, B, and C are first disclosed. Subsequently, A and B are
remediated, but C is not. In this case, the firm is not considered to have remediated
MWs. Another example is when weaknesses A, B, and C are remediated but new
weaknesses D and E have surfaced. As such, the firm is also not considered to have
remediated MWs.
9. Although SOX section 301 requires that all members on the audit committee be
independent, SOX refers to the SEC for the definition of independence. The SEC
(2003c) defines an "independent" director as one not receiving, other than for service
on the board, any consulting, advisory, or other compensatory fee from the issuer, and
not being an affiliated person of the issuer, or any subsidiary thereof. However, the
exchanges have more stringent definitions of independence, such as limiting
ex-employees who have been with the firm within the past three years, limiting
cross-compensation committee links, and so on. Consistent with Carcello and Neal
2000 and Krishnan 2005,1 apply a more stringent definition of independence. I define
nonindependent or affiliated directors as current or former officers or employees of the
firm or of a related entity, relatives of management, professional advisers to the firm
(e.g., consultants, bank officers, legal counsels), officers of significant suppliers or
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customers of the firm, and interlocking directors. On the basis of this definition, 21
sample firms (10 percent) do not have fully independent audit committees. Of these
firms, 17 have at least one ex-employee sitting on the audit committee (in one case the
audit committee member is still a general partner of one of the firm's subsidiaries). In
one firm, an audit committee member has interlocking relationships as disclosed under
the "compensation committee interlocks and insider participation" section of the proxy
statement. In another firm, an audit committee member has familial relationships with
key employees of the firm. In the remaining two firms, an audit committee member is a
key executive of another firm that engages in transactions with the firm.
10. Klein (2002b) also finds that board independence (based on all the board members) is
positively correlated with audit committee independence. In this study, the correlation
coefficient between audit committee independence and board independence (based on
all the board members) is 0.415 (p-value < 0.01). If board variables (based on all the
board members) and audit committee variables are included in the same regression, the
high correlations among these variables can affect the results of this study.
11. For discussions on the controversies surrounding the definition of financial expertise
under SOX section 407, see DeFond, Hann, and Hu 2005; Dhaliwal, Naiker, and
Navissi 2006; and Carcello, Hollingsworth, Klein, and Neal 2006. The initial SOX
promulgations recommended a narrow definition that focuses on whether the director
has prior accounting-related experience with SEC financial reporting. However, critics
argue that this definition is unnecessarily restrictive and limits the pool of qualified
directors. The final version of SOX effectively expands the definition of financial
expertise by also including the expertise gained through experience supervising
employees with financial reporting responsibilities and overseeing the performance of
companies.
12. Examples of category A weaknesses include inadequate intemal controls for
accounting for loss contingencies, deficiencies in the documentation of a receivables
securitization program, and inadequate intemal controls over the application of new
accounting principles or the application of existing accounting principles to new
transactions (Doyle et al. 2007b, Appendix B). Examples of category B weaknesses
include override by senior management, ineffective control environment, weak tone at
the top, inadequate fraud detection, pervasive ineffective processes, and ineffective
accounting personnel (Doyle et al. 2007b, Appendix B; Moody's 2006, Appendix 3).
Consistent with Doyle et al. 2007b, firms that have at least three category A
weaknesses are also considered to have category B weaknesses.
13. For instance, MWs that occur in firms that are larger, more complex, and growing
rapidly are more likely to attract the attention of investors and regulators, which should
provide incentives for these firms to remediate MWs promptly. On the other hand,
these firms may need more time to remediate MWs because the MWs affect more
segments of the firm, and fast-growing firms need not only to invest in resources in
remediating MWs but also to match the intemal controls with the firms' growth. Firms
that undergo restructuring or mergers and acquisitions have greater incentives to fix
MWs due to their desire to emerge stronger after the organizational changes. However,
these firms need more time to remediate MWs because resources might be diverted to
other areas during the organizational changes, hence impeding remediation efforts.
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14. For NON remediators, I take the average values from the fiscal year the MWs are
disclosed to the fiscal year of the second SOX section 404 report.
15. Consistent with Francis, Philbrick, and Schipper 1994, firms that operate in industries
with Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes of 2833-2836 (biotechnology),
3570-3577 and 7370-7374 (computers), 3600-3674 (electronics), and 5200-6961
(retailing) are considered to be operating in a litigious industry.
16. Because I use only accelerated filers, the sample is hiased toward larger firms, which
have better intemal controls (Doyle et al. 2007h). This may offset the bias in using only
firms with MWs, which have weaker intemal controls.
17. Firms with weaknesses that are dated too far back are firms that disclosed MWs in their
filings during the sample period, but had already detected the weaknesses in fiscal year
2000, 2001, or 2002. Because these firms had already remediated the weaknesses in
fiscal year 2003,1 exclude these firms from the sample.
18. There are 16 firms that require special mention. Five firms have an unqualified first
SOX section 404 opinion but an adverse second SOX section 404 opinion. These firms
are treated as NON remediators because MWs existed at the time of the first SOX
section 404 report but were not detected. Eleven firms have the second SOX section
404 report but do not have the first SOX section 404 report due to their initial
nonaccelerated filer status. Seven of these firms (4 NON remediators and 3 SLOW
remediators) clearly have not remediated MWs at the time at which the first SOX
section 404 report would have been issued, because the firms asserted that MWs still
existed at that time. Four of the other 11 firms asserted that MWs had been remediated
at the time at which the first SOX section 404 report would have been issued. This is
confirmed by the second SOX section 404 opinion, which is unqualified. Sensitivity
tests show that the results are not affected by the exclusion of these 16 firms.
19. The Pearson correlation coefficients among the independent variables are below
+ / -0.40, except the coefficient between ACMEET and BDMEET, which is 0.41
(p-value < 0.01); the coefficient between BDSIZE and LGTA, which is
0.41 (;?-value < 0.01); and the coefficient between LCTA and SEGMENTS, which
is 0.40 (p-value < 0.01). The variance inflation factors of all the independent variables
are under 1.6, except for LGTA, which is 1.89. Hence, multicollinearity does not
appear to be a concern.
20. As mentioned in section 3,1 measure nonaudit committee board characteristics
because audit committee characteristics are highly correlated with board
characteristics. I reestimate the model in Table 4 using board independence and size
based on full board characteristics (i.e., based on all the board members). The results
(not tabulated) for the corporate govemance variables are similar to those in Table 4,
except that the coefficient on board independence becomes insignificant at the
conventional level (p-value = 0.23). This insignificant result could be due to the high
correlation between the board independence and audit committee independence
variables (correlation coefficient = 0.42). Hence, I reestimate this model by removing
the audit committee variables and using only the board variables based on full board
characteristics. The results (not tabulated) show that the coefficient on board
independence is positive and significant (p-value < 0.05), consistent with the results in
Table 4. Finally, I reestimate the model in Table 4 by removing the board variables and
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using only the audit committee variahles. The results (not tahulated) for NONACCEXP
and ACSIZE are similar to those in Tahle 4.
21. This method of measuring timeliness is similar to Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2008, who
determine whether firms remediate MWs on the hasis of the first SOX section 404
opinion. I measure the govemance variables at the end of the fiscal year of the first
SOX section 404 report to reflect the govemance characteristics at the time of the first
SOX section 404 report.
22. There are some interesting results in model 3. The coefficients on ACMEET and
BDMEET sie. negative and significant (p-value < 0.05), suggesting that audit
committee and board meeting frequency could refiect the magnitude of the problems
being faced by the firm. The coefficient on AUDjCHANGE is positive and significant
(p-value < 0.05), suggesting that firms that change auditors subsequent to the
detection of MWs are more likely to remediate MWs in a timely manner.
23. I thank Larry Brown and Marcus Caylor for providing the govemance data. The data
are available at http://www.robinson.gsu.edu/accountancy/gov_score.html.
24. To shed some light on how the addition of these firms would affect the results of this
study, I compare the govemance characteristics (at the time of detection of the MWs)
of these firms with those of the sample firms. Using firms with available govemance
data, I find no significant differences in govemance characteristics between these two
groups of firms, except that the sample firms have significantly larger audit committees
than the firms that terminate their securities registration or delay the filings of their
10-K reports. Assuming that these latter firms are firms that are not likely to remediate
MWs in a timely manner, it is possible that the addition of these firms to the sample
firms would strengthen the result on the positive association between audit committee
size and firms' timeliness in the remediation of MWs.
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